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Abstract
Financial institutions are increasingly linked internationally and engaged in cross-border
operations. As a result, nancial crises and potential bail-outs by governments have im-
portant international implications. Extending Allen and Gale (2000) we provide a model of
international contagion allowing for bank bail-outs nanced by distortionary taxes. In the
sequential game between governments, there are ineciencies due to spillovers, free-riding
and limited burden-sharing. When countries are of equal size, an increase in cross-border
deposit holdings improves, in general, the non-cooperative outcome. For ecient crisis man-
agment, ex-ante scal burden sharing is essential as ex-post contracts between governments
do not achieve the same global welfare.
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With globalization, banks have become more and more linked internationally and engaged in
cross-border operations. As a result, banking crises today have international dimensions which
make bail-out decisions less of a domestic and more of an international issue, with governments in
dierent countries responding and consumers in dierent countries being aected. In this paper
we present a theoretical model of international contagion, where governments decide domestically
upon ex-post intervention and explore ineciencies from unilateral decision-making. We analyze
how dierent forms of cooperation can improve upon the non-cooperative outcome.
Banking crises are a frequent phenomenon. Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) compiled a data
set with information on 117 systemic banking crises that have occurred in 93 countries since the
late 1970s. In most countries, banking crises led to intervention by national governments, the
scal costs of which have been considerable. Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) study a sample of
40 countries and nd that, in order to restore the nancial system, governments spent on average
12.8 percent of national GDP. Often, this implies rising government debt. Reinhart and Rogo
(2009) investigate the aftermath of nancial crisis and nd that the real value of government
debt tends to increase sharply. While the collapse in tax revenues resulting from contractions of
real output is the major reason for this, bail-out and recapitalization costs can be an important
factor, too. During the recent nancial crisis, governments all over the world have responded
with signicant nancial support. In a report, the IMF provides an overview of taken measures
and related costs. Upfront commitments for nancing pledged support operations are estimated
at 5.7 % of GDP for the advanced G-20 as of August 2009. Pledged capital injections alone
amount to 2.2% of G-20 GDP. (see Tables 3 and Annex Tables 3 and 4 of IMF (2009)).
The recent global nancial crisis, which emanated from the United States, showed how crisis
can spread from one country to another. Degryse and Penas (2009) analyze cross-border conta-
gion risk for the period from 1996 to 2006 using data on cross-border exposure of 17 countries.
They nd that the speed of propagation of contagion has increased over the past years and that
a shock which aects the liabilities of one country may undermine the stability of the global
nancial system. In the face of contagion risk due to increasing cross-border exposures and high
economic costs associated with banking crises, banks in distress become an international issue.
Claessens (2009) investigates nancial nationalism in the context of the current nancial crisis.
He gives evidence for international eects of unilateral government intervention. Guarantees
2on deposits and other liabilities issued by individual countries had beggar-thy-neighbor eects.
Countries also started to ring-fence assets in their jurisdictions when cross-border entities showed
signs of failing, like the German government that froze Lehman assets in 2008. Other examples
for con
icting international interests in the context of nancial institutions in distress are the
AIG bail-out by the U.S. Federal Reserve in 2008, which beneted several non-U.S. nancial
institutions, as well as the bankruptcy case of Icesave in 2009 concerning Dutch and British
depositors.
Such con
icting international interests give rise to potential gains from cooperation between
governments. The initiative of the European Union toward a new nancial architecture, a
response to the current nancial crisis, is, amongst other things, meant to foster cooperation in
crisis management. It has been argued that the resolution of distressed cross-border banks within
the EU is not handled eciently. Crisis management is limited to the national level or ad-hoc
cross-border solutions (see De Larosiere Report (2009)). Correspondingly, little cooperation of
governments was observed during the current crisis. An exception are Belgium, the Netherlands
and Luxembourg, with some involvement of France, who cooperated to a certain extent in
order to resolve Dexia and Fortis (see Claessens (2009)). The rst plans of the EU Commission
to endow a European regulator with the right to enjoin individual governments to bail out a
national bank at their own expense was dismissed. However, due to the perceived need for EU-
wide coordination, the European Systemic Risk Board, a new EU institution, has been given
the task to issue policy recommendations on how to deal with distressed banks.
In the following we study a model of international contagion where banks are linked through
interbank deposits. We analyze a sequential game between two governments facing a potentially
contagious banking crisis. Governments can prevent bankruptcy by doing a bail-out nanced by
distortionary taxes, which has spillover eects on the other country. We show that ineciencies
in the bail-out decision of governments arise when there is no international cooperation. We
introduce private cross-country deposits to study their eects on eciency in the non-cooperative
outcome. In a next step, we focus on scal burden sharing, which can further improve eciency.
Finally, we model Nash bargaining between governments and consider how a central authority
with mandating and/or scal power or contracts impact global and national welfare.
Contagion model Building upon Allen and Gale (2000), we model cross-border nancial
linkages in form of interbank deposits. Interbank deposits allow for risk sharing of idiosyncratic
3liquidity needs, but induce systemic risk. Crisis spreads from the one bank to the other bank
in the system when the former goes bankrupt due to unexpected liquidity needs and interbank
deposits cannot be repaid fully. Facing a bankrupt bank, governments can decide not to take
any action. Then, the bankrupt bank is liquidated. Alternatively, the government may bail out
its bank nanced by distortionary taxes. This action directly aects depositors of the bank that
is saved and domestic households that are taxed. Moreover, it impacts the foreign bank and
its depositors, either because contagion is avoided (spillover eect on the aected country) or
because its liquidation value is raised (spillover eect on the crisis country).
We study ineciencies in government intervention when there is no international authority.
In the sequential bail-out game the country where the crisis arises moves rst, the other one
follows. We identify three distinct sources of ineciencies. First, externalities arise from the fact
that governments maximize national welfare, but do not take the spillover eects into account
which impact the welfare of the other country. In this context, we nd a second source of
ineciency, a free-riding problem that arises through the sequential nature of our model. The
crisis country may not bail out its domestic bank because it knows that then the aected country
will do a bail-out. This, in turn, benets the crisis country through the positive spillover in form
of increased returns on interbank deposits. In this way, as the rst mover, it can free ride on
the bail-out carried out by the aected country. The larger the interbank linkages, the larger
the spillovers and the bigger the incentives to free-ride. A third ineciency arises due to no
burden-sharing, i.e. the inability, in the non-cooperative game, to share the costs of a bail-out
that arise in one country between the two governments. Furthermore, we analyze the eects of
cross-country deposits and asymmetric country sizes on government intervention. Due to private
cross-country deposits, governments take spillover eects in their bail-out decision into account.
Whether cross-country deposits tend to increase or decrease eciency depends on the extent of
cross-country deposits and potential asymmetries in country sizes. We nd that, if country sizes
are equal, cross-country deposits tend to reduce ineciencies.
We study three dierent forms of cooperation: a central authority with mandating power
and/or scal power, and contracts. Our main ndings are the following: A central authority
with mandating and scal power achieves the best ex-post outcome trading o income inequal-
ity with distortions from taxation. At an optimum, burden sharing is such that the aected
country always contributes more than the crisis country. This can, but does not need to im-
ply a Pareto improvement compared to the non-cooperative solution. A central authority with
4mandating power alone cannot induce a Pareto improvement compared to the non-cooperative
solution, whereas contracts imply this by their very nature. The two regimes alleviate dierent
ineciencies. A clear ranking between them in terms of eciency is therefore not possible. In
general, mandating power alone or ex-post contracts do not achieve as high a welfare level as
an authority with mandating and scal power.
Related literature There are several approaches to model contagion. One is to model con-
tagion as driven by information. Bad news about one bank imply, due to a correlation in the
value of assets, bad news for another institution (see Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) and Chen
(1999)). A dierent mechanism is proposed in Diamond and Rajan (2005) who show that con-
tagion can be an equilibrium phenomenon because bankruptcy of one bank may reduce the
available aggregate liquidity, which then causes bankruptcy of potentially all banks in the sys-
tem. The third approach, which we follow in this paper, explains contagion by the fact that
banks are connected through their balance sheets. In Allen and Gale (2000) systemic risk arises
because banks are linked through interbank deposits that insure banks against idiosyncratic
liquidity risk. Default of one bank reduces the value of assets in other banks, the ultimate con-
sequence of which can be the failure of the entire banking system. Dasgupta (2004) applies the
theory of global games, developed by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and introduced to this
setting by Morris and Shin (2003), to a similar setup. Depositors receive private, but correlated
signals about the fundamentals of the bank they deposited in. Depending on the signal, a bank
run occurs and crisis spreads along the channels of interbank deposits.
There is a large literature on optimal government intervention at the national level and
the role for a Lender of Last Resort (LLR). The classic doctrine of Bagehot (1873) that central
banks should lend to illiquid, but solvent banks has been studied extensively (see i.e. Rochet and
Vives (2004), Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) and Freixas and Parigi (2008) for a summary
of the literature on the LLR). Castiglionesi (2007) investigates the role of a central bank in
the framework of Allen and Gale (2000) where it can prevent nancial contagion by setting
appropriate reserve requirements. Bail-outs have also been studied by Diamond and Rajan
(2002). In their paper, bail-outs increase the aggregate liquidity available, which can lead to
ambiguous eects on the stability of the banking system. In Gorton and Huang (2004), private
hoarding of liquidity is socially costly. A government can reduce this hoarding by subsidizing
distressed banks as it can issue government securities backed by future tax revenues. Goodhart
5and Huang (2005) consider the trade-o between liquidity support and moral hazard costs which
central banks face and rationalize the argument for so-called 'constructive ambiguity'. Cordella
and Yeyati (2003) show that bail-outs can instead have risk-reducing eects. The optimal
institutional arrangement for the LLR function is the focus of some further studies e.g. Kahn
and Santos (2005) and Repullo (2000).
Some recent contributions put banking theory in an international perspective. One focus
of the literature on regulation is on analyzing the scope for international cooperation among
bank regulators, i.e. on understanding the interactions between internationally operating banks,
which are to be regulated, and national regulatory incentives. Holthausen and Roende (2005)
study multinational banks and optimal closure policies, where each authority maximizes national
welfare. Asymmetries of operating banks and of regulators' preferences across countries lead to
suboptimal closure decisions in a 'cheap talk' game. Acharya (2003) considers the international
standardization of ex-ante capital adequacy ratios and ex-post closure policies in a framework
where domestic banks compete internationally. In his model, competition among banks leads
to inecient closure policies and nally increased risk in the banking system. Dell'Ariccia
and Marquez (2006) look at the scope for centralized regulation when competing banks are
heterogeneous across countries. Again, asymmetries lead to suboptimally low standards due to
a trade-o between 
exibility in policy design and increased stability of the banking system.
There is a policy debate on regulation and the LLR function in the context of a globalizing
banking sector, especially within the European Union. Vives (2001) argues in favor of a bigger
role for the European Central Bank in crisis management and more centralized supervisory
arrangements. Teixeira and Schinasi (2006) raise the issue of cross-border externalities and the
need for a centralized LLR for the EU Single Market. Pauly (2008) considers crisis management
in Europe and makes the case for nancial burden sharing rules among national governments.
Claessens (2009) reviews government interventions taken during the current nancial crisis with
respect to competition policy and points at the need for international coordination.
While there is considerable theoretical work on international issues related to regulation and
supervision, there are only few papers that study cooperation problems arising in an international
banking crisis. Agur (2009) treats the question of the optimal institutional structure for a LLR
in an international framework where depositors have imperfect information about the solvency
of banks and government intervention has a signaling eect. While national governments do
not internalize the contagion eect, a central authority has limited signaling power. Therefore,
6the maximum welfare is achieved by central coordination rather than pure centralization of the
bail-out decision. Freixas (2003) discusses externalities from bail-outs in a multi-country setting.
In a standard public goods model, he analyzes cooperation mechanisms which implement rst-
best bail-outs. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2009) extend this model and consider ex-ante scal
burden sharing rules in order to induce optimal cooperation. Our model goes beyond the pure
public goods problem of bank bail-outs that the latter two papers study and the framework of
Agur (2009), as we explicitly model international interbank linkages and bail-out incentives in
a contagion framework based on Allen and Gale (2000).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section
3 discusses centralized and decentralized decision making and their eciency properties. Section
4 extends the model by allowing for private cross-country deposits. Section 5 discusses scal
burden sharing. Section 6 considers contracts. Section 7 compares dierent forms of cooperation
with respect to eciency and Pareto improvements. Section 8 studies ring-fencing. Section 9
concludes.
2 The model
Our model builds on Allen and Gale (2000). We use their basic framework to model interbank
linkages and contagion. We extend the analysis to an international setting with two countries
and allow for government interventions in case of bankruptcy after uncertainty about liquidity
needs has been resolved. Moreover, we introduce a production sector operating at date t = 1,
employing labor whose income can be taxed by the government in order to nance interventions.
2.1 Setup
There are three time periods indexed by t = 0;1;2 and a continuum of ex-ante identical agents
of measure one. Each agent is endowed with one unit of a single consumption good at date
t = 0. It serves as num eraire and can be invested in two dierent assets, a short asset and a
long asset. The short asset represents a storage technology. For each unit invested at date t, it
pays out one unit at date t + 1. The investment in the long asset can only take place at date
t = 0, but gives a higher pay-o R > 1 at date t = 2. The long asset can be liquidated in period
t = 1, but early liquidation is costly. For one unit invested at date t = 0, only r < 1 units can be
7recovered. At date t = 1, each agent decides on its supply of labor to the perfectly competitive
production sector. Each unit of labor produces 1 unit of the consumption good. Consumers
have Diamond-Dybvig preferences. With probability , an agent only values consumption at
date t = 1 (early type), while with probability 1  it is of the late type and values consumption





u(c1) with probability 
u(c2) with probability 1   ;
(1)
where u is assumed to be twice continuously dierentiable, increasing and strictly concave.
Consumption of an agent of type i ci, is composed of three dierent elements: the return from
the investment di made at date t = 0, labor income n, which depends on the labor supplied at
date t = 1, and disutility of work expressed in consumption terms.1 That is:










Disutility of work is quadratic, with shape parameters  and . Due to our assumptions on the
utility function, the labor supply decision of the agent is independent of its type and we can










Therefore, in an optimum each agent supplies n = =2 units of labor. With the last term of
Equation 2, we normalize the utility contribution of labor for the optimal labor supply to 0,
which is convenient for our subsequent analysis.3
By the law of large numbers, the probability  of being an early consumer, is also the fraction
of early consumers in the economy. We assume that the population is divided into two groups of
consumers, each of mass one. Within each group, the fraction of early consumers is stochastic.
Across groups it is perfectly negatively correlated. There are two possible states of nature S1
1Our setup is similar to Cooper, Kempf, and Peled (2008).
2Late consumers, who only consume at date t = 2, store their labor income from date 1 to date 2. The
disutility of labor, although conceptually arising at date t = 1, unfolds only at t = 2.
3Due to the normalization, the date-0 investment decision of the bank is not impacted by the level of the
expected labor income and the bank's optimization problem that we consider later can be formulated as is
standard in the literature.
8and S2, which are summarized in Table 1, where H denotes a high fraction of early consumers
and 0 < L < H < 1. Both states occur with equal probability. Groups of consumers are thus
identical in expectation and aggregate demand for liquidity is the same in both states.
Table 1: Liquidity shocks
Group A Group B Probability
State S1 h l 0:5
State S2 l h 0:5
2.2 Optimal risk sharing and the rst-best allocation
To start with, we analyze the rst-best allocation given the two available investment technologies.
As there is no aggregate uncertainty, the optimal allocation implies perfect risk-sharing and
allocations are independent of the two states. In order to nd the rst-best solution, we consider
a social planner that has perfect information, hence knows the type of each consumer. The
planner chooses investment at date t = 0 so as to maximize overall expected utility treating




u(c1(d1)) + (1   )u(c2(d2)) (4)
s:t: x + y  1;
d1  y;
(1   )d2  Rx;
where x and y are the per capita amounts invested in the long and the short asset, respectively.
The three constraints represent the resource constraints at date t = 0, t = 1 and t = 2. The
social planner anticipates the optimal labor supply by the agents. Substituting n = =2 yields
the standard objective function, which is independent of labor income: u(d1) + (1   )u(d2).
The unique solution to the problem is characterized by the condition:
u0(  d1) = Ru0(  d2); (5)
where  d1 and  d2 denote the consumption levels that early and late consumers receive.
9As aggregate consumption at dates 1 and 2 is constant and liquidation of the long asset is
costly, it is optimal to provide date-1 consumption by investing in the short asset and date-2
consumption by investing in the long asset. Thus, at the optimum, all constraints bind, and
 d1 = y= as well as  d2 = R(1   y)=(1   ).
2.3 Decentralization and interbank deposits
In this section, we introduce a banking sector and show that the rst-best allocation from
above can be decentralized as an equilibrium with competitive banks. First, we describe the
decentralized setting and dene the equilibrium. Second, we discuss a specic deposit and
interbank deposit contract and derive the corresponding equilibrium. Third, we show that the
resulting allocation coincides with the rst-best and prove equilibrium existence.
Assume that only banks can invest in the long asset. Therefore, they have two advantages:
They can invest in both assets and, by pooling endowments, provide insurance against liquidity
risk. The banking sector is perfectly competitive. This implies that, in order to attract funds,
banks have to oer a contract that maximizes the expected utility of its depositors. We consider
the following deposit contract D that is not contingent on the state of nature. A depositor can
choose to withdraw at date t = 1 or at date t = 2. Per unit deposited, the contract species a
repayment d1 to depositors that withdraw at date t = 1. A late withdrawer receives a pro rata
share of the bank assets remaining at date t = 2, which is denoted by d2. If the bank cannot
serve all withdrawals at date t = 1, it is bankrupt and all depositors receive the same pro rata
repayment. As there is no sequential service constraint, no expectation driven bank runs occur.4
We assume that each bank faces uncertainty about the fraction of early and late depositors
as described in Table 1. Thus Group A corresponds to the depositors of Bank A and Group B
to depositors of Bank B. This uncertainty introduces an incentive for banks to sign contracts
with each other in order to insure against liquidity risk. Interbank deposit contracts have the
same specication as the deposit contracts between consumers and banks. Repayments per unit
of deposit are contingent on the date of withdrawal (dI
1;dI
2), but independent of the state. If the
counterpart bank goes bankrupt, a bank receives a pro rata share of the counterpart's liquidation
4Note that our model does not feature multiple equilibria as e.g. in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Cooper and
Ross (1998), Ennis and Keister (2006) and Ennis and Keister (2009). Therefore, government intervention in our
model is not driven by an equilibrium selection motive, but by a liquidity shortage.
10value and thus incurs a loss on the interbank deposits. The amount of interbank deposits each
bank makes is denoted by z.
The timing is as follows. At t = 0, consumers sign deposit contracts with the banks and
deposit their endowments. Banks sign interbank deposit contracts and each deposit amount z.
Moreover, banks invest in the long and the short asset. At date t = 1 uncertainty resolves and
consumers learn privately about their types. At that stage, consumers can decide to withdraw
their claims or wait until next period. Early consumers withdraw always, as they only have
utility from consumption at date t = 1. Late consumers decide whether to withdraw at date
t = 1 and store the good or to withdraw at date t = 2, depending on payos d1 and d2. Banks
do the same and decide whether to withdraw the claims dI
1z that they have at date t = 1. Dene
a withdrawal strategy for each bank wI and late consumers wL contingent on the state:
wI(d;) : fdI
1;dI
2g  fg ! f0;1g;
wL(d) : fd1;d2g ! f0;1g;
where 1 stands for withdrawal at date t = 1 and 0 for withdrawal only at date t = 2. Consumers
and banks know the state that occurred and the fraction of early depositors in each bank.
An equilibrium is characterized by a deposit and an interbank deposit contract, and with-
drawal strategies of banks and late consumers.
Denition 1 An equilibrium is a deposit contract fD = (d1;d2)g, an interbank deposit contract
fDI = (dI
1;dI
2)g, an amount of interbank deposits fzg, a withdrawal strategy of banks fwI(d;) :
fd1;d2g  fg ! f0;1gg, a withdrawal strategy of late consumers fwL(d) : fd1;d2g ! f0;1gg
such that
(i) the deposit contract D maximizes expected depositor utility given fDI;zg,
(ii) there does not exist another interbank deposit contract and amount of interbank deposits
fDI0
;z0g that imply a higher expected utility for depositors,
(iii) given fDI;z;g, bank withdrawal strategies are optimal,
(iv) given fD;zg, late consumer strategies are optimal.
Next, we describe an equilibrium characterized by a set of D, DI, z, wI(dI;) and wL(d) and
show that its allocation coincides with the rst-best allocation derived before.
Consider the following equilibrium: The deposit and interbank deposit contracts are identical
11and given by D = DI = (  d1;  d2), as determined by Condition 5, and the interbank deposits are
given by z =  d1(   L). Banks withdraw early if their fraction of early consumers is low and
wait if the fraction is high.5 Late consumers only withdraw at date t = 2.
For an illustration of the equilibrium, suppose that State S1 occurs. The liquidity needs
of early consumers of Bank A are  d1H. Given the high liquidity needs, Bank A calls in its
interbank claims and withdraws z  d1 =  d1( L). The budget constraint Bank A faces at date
t = 1 is y +  d1(   L) =  d1H, which corresponds to y =   d1, the date-1 budget constraint
of the social planner. Bank B with the low liquidity needs does not withdraw its interbank
deposits, but pays out the amount requested by Bank A. Therefore, the budget constraint Bank
B faces at date t = 1 is L  d1 = y   d1( L), which again coincides with the budget constraint
of the social planner. Similarly one can show that the budget constraints at date t = 2 given
the interbank deposits and withdrawal decision of the banks and the consumers specied above
reduce to the one of the social planner. Thus, given the interbank contracts, interbank deposits
and withdrawal decisions, the bank's investment problem reduces to the one of the social planner.
The rst-best allocation is implemented.
In order to prove existence of the characterized equilibrium, consider the following argument.
Consumers choose the deposit contract that maximizes their expected utility. Due to perfect
competition in the banking sector, this deposit contract has to be the constrained maximum
that can be attained by a pair of banks given the investment technology and the instruments
fD;DI;zg. As shown, the values for fD;DI;zg suggested above attain the global rst-best
given the investment technology. Thus, there is no possible deviation by any pair of banks that
would allow them to oer deposit contracts with the same level of expected utility but positive
prots.
2.4 Contagion
Now, we introduce the possibility of bank runs and contagion. The decentralized rst-best
allocation is fragile in so far as a perturbation can lead to bankruptcy of all banks in the system.
5We assume that interbank deposits equal the minimum amount necessary to implement the rst-best allo-
cation. Interbank deposits could also be larger. However, if there is a small but positive probability on the
perturbation state, which we introduce in the next section, then banks optimally hold only the minimum amount
of interbank deposits necessary to implement liquidity insurance for states S1 and S2 in order to minimize the
contagion risk.
12Following Allen and Gale (2000), we perturb the banking system by introducing a third state
that is assigned a zero-probability at date t = 0. This assumption is a departure from rational
expectations. It allows us to focus on bankruptcy, contagion and ex-post intervention as it shuts
down potential eects from ex-ante expectations on the real investment allocation.
Contracts and investment decisions at date t = 0 are the rst-best allocation, as in the
previous section. In the third state  S, aggregate liquidity needs are higher than expected. As
illustrated in Table 2, there is an additional fraction  of early consumers in Bank A. If states
S1 or S2 occur, then the allocations at date t = 1 and t = 2 are rst-best. However, if State  S
occurs, the continuation equilibrium is dierent. As we are interested in reactions to bankruptcy
and potential contagion, we concentrate our attention in the following on this state.
Table 2: Liquidity shocks with perturbation
Bank A Bank B Probability
State S1 h l 0:5
State S2 l h 0:5
State  S  +  =
h+l
2 +   0
Given state  S, we can specify conditions under which rstly, bankruptcy of Bank A and
secondly, contagion and hence bankruptcy of Bank B occurs. In order to make liquidation of







From this a "pecking order" can be derived comparing the costs of obtaining date-1 consumption
in terms of future consumption. Costs increase in the following order: short asset, interbank
deposits, long assets. In state  S, the short assets of Bank A are not enough to satisfy its date-1
liquidity needs  d1( + ) as the optimal investment decision at date t = 0 implies y =  d1.
Therefore, facing the additional fraction of early withdrawers and given the assumption on the
pecking order, Bank A calls in its interbank claims before starting to liquidate the long asset.
Bank A is bankrupt if by liquidating all assets, it still cannot meet demands of its depositors.
More specically, it goes bankrupt if it has to liquidate so much of the long asset in order to
satisfy liquidity needs of early consumers that late consumers would receive a payo smaller
than d1. Anticipating this, late consumers then decide to withdraw their funds early and a bank
13run occurs. Due to losses from early liquidation of the long asset, all consumers get less than
the pay-os originally promised to early depositors in the deposit contract and d1 <  d1. We can
derive a condition for bankruptcy of Bank A:
  d1 > r

(1   y)  




The term on the left hand side of Equation 7 represents the additional liquidity needs that
cannot be satised by the investment in the short asset. As discussed, Bank A calls in its
interbank claims. This, however, entails that also Bank B withdraws its interbank claims early
as it faces more liquidity needs than it can satisfy with its short asset. Therefore, the interbank
claims, which are of the same size, cancel out and do not appear in Equation 7. In order
to avoid a run of its (late) depositors, Bank A must keep so much of the long asset that the
return that it yields at date t = 2 is at least as high as to give every late consumer the pay-
o promised to early consumers  d1. Therefore the bank must keep
(1  )  d1
R units of the long
asset. Only (1 y) 
(1  )  d1
R units of the long asset can be liquidated, which yield a return of
r





at date t = 1. If these resources, the so-called buer, are not enough to
satisfy the unexpected demand of the fraction  of additional early depositors, then Bank A is
bankrupt.
Bankruptcy of Bank A has an impact on the other bank through the interbank deposits.
Facing a higher than expected fraction of early consumers, Bank A calls in its deposits from
Bank B. In order to meet the demand by Bank A, Bank B equally withdraws its deposits from
Bank A. However, Bank A is bankrupt and is liquidated. Similar to Bank A's private depositors,
Bank B receives only a pro rata share of Bank A's liquidation value. This share is necessarily
smaller than the value of the actual claims (r < 1). Whether these losses are sucient to cause
bankruptcy of Bank B depends on whether the buer of Bank B is large enough to provide
sucient liquidity at date t = 1. The following expression gives the bankruptcy condition for
Bank B:
z(  d1   qA) > r

(1   y)  




where qA represents the liquidation value of Bank A. This value is aected by bankruptcy of
Bank B. If both banks go bankrupt, then each bank receives a pro rata share of the other's
liquidation value. With symmetric interbank deposits, the mutual claims cancel out and each
bank's liquidation value qj is given by the value of the short asset plus the liquidation value of
14the long asset, hence qj =  q = y +(1 y)r; 8j 2 fA;Bg. If the bank hit by contagion (Bank B)
does not go bankrupt, but fully repays the interbank deposit claims, then the liquidation value
of Bank A is raised. This link is important for our later analysis. For bankruptcy of Bank B,
Condition 8 has to hold in the case where Bank B fully repays Bank A's claims, hence when
qA = ^ q =
y+r(1 y)+z  d1
1+z . This is a sucient condition for bankruptcy as lower liquidation values
move this condition further towards bankruptcy.
Consider again Conditions 7 and 8 and assume that they hold with equality, i.e. that there
is no bankruptcy. All other things equal, a lower liquidation value r or a lower return of the
long asset R causes bankruptcy. The lower the liquidation value of the long asset, the more long
assets have to be liquidated early in order to meet date-1 demand. Similarly, the lower the return
on the long asset, the fewer long assets can be liquidated without lowering the pay-o of late
depositors below  d1, which would cause a bank run. Moreover, a larger amount  d1 promised to
early depositors leads to bankruptcy.  d1 depends on the relative risk aversion of the consumers.
If the relative risk aversion coecient is above 1, then the promised pay-o to early depositors
exceeds the return of the storage technology,  d1 > 1, and liquidity insurance is provided to early
depositors.
2.5 Government intervention within one jurisdiction
From now on, we assume that the two bankruptcy conditions 7 and 8 hold. We cast the model
in an international setting with two banks and two countries. Bank A is located in Country A,
Bank B in Country B. Banks are linked internationally through interbank deposits as described
before. Each country has a government that maximizes welfare of its population and that can
decide to intervene when faced with potential bankruptcy of its domestic bank. In order to
nance an intervention, it can tax the labor income of domestic agents at date t=1. It has to
have a balanced budget.6 In this section, we discuss possible forms of government intervention
and the determinants of optimal policy responses within a country. We formulate the decision
problem of the government in a way that is valid for both countries.
At date t=1, a government that faces potential bankruptcy of its domestic bank chooses
6We assume that the government cannot borrow. If we allowed for this possibility, the government would have
to raise taxes in the future to pay back its debt. The possibility to smooth taxes over time can reduce distortions.
However, as long as raising funds is costly, the main trade-o remains unaected.
15between two actions.7 Firstly, it can decide not to intervene at all. Given our assumptions, this
leads immediately to bankruptcy and liquidation of its bank. Each depositor receives a pro rata
share q of the liquidated bank. Late consumers store the return and consume at date t = 2. If
there is no intervention, which we denote by the subscript n, the welfare level V of the country
is given by:
Vn = u(q): (9)
Secondly, in order to prevent bankruptcy, the government can bail out its bankrupt bank. The
cost of a bail-out can be derived from bankruptcy conditions 7 and 8, respectively. For a bail-
out a government has to supply at least the additional liquidity that the bank needs in order to
prevent a bank run. That is each depositor, independently of his type, has to receive at least
 d1. If the bail-out sum is larger than this minimal amount, the bank liquidates less long assets
and late consumers get a higher pay-o. Let b denote the pay-o that late depositors receive
when the bank is bailed out. Let gap be the additional unexpected liquidity needs that occur
in state  S and let  be the fraction of early depositors that the bank faces. Then the general
formula for the costs of a bail-out is given by:
G(b) = gap   r






We distinguish dierent degrees of bail-outs by the amount b that late depositors receive. We
dene a partial bail-out as the case where the minimum amount of liquidity is provided to avoid
a bank run, i.e. all consumers of the bank receive  d1.8 In contrast, we dene a full bail-out
as a situation where so much liquidity is provided that late depositors receive the return they
expected ex-ante, i.e. b =  d2. Bail-out costs are linearly increasing in b. The optimal bail-out
may be dierent from the two discussed above. It trades o the losses from liquidation with
the costs of providing government funds. In order to nance the bail-out, the government taxes
labor income at date t = 1. We assume that consumers observe the bail-out and know the tax
rate   0, which the government imposes. With this information, agents decide upon how
7Notice that we do not consider the option of stopping convertibility. Stopping convertibility would avoid a
bank run at no direct costs. However, a fraction  of early consumers would not be able to withdraw, which would
reduce their consumption to zero.
8A deposit insurance would guarantee the same pay-os to consumer. However, there is a dierence between a
deposit insurance and a partial bail-out. In case of deposit insurance, the bank goes bankrupt and the government
pays the dierence between the liquidation value of a bank and the deposits. A partial bail-out is less costly as
the provided funds avoid the early liquidation of some part of the long asset. For each unit of liquidity that the
government provides, R=r funds are recovered.
16much labor they are going to supply. Thus, taxes distort the agents' labor supply decision. The
labor supply function is now given by:




In order to raise a total amount of taxes G, the government has to set the tax rate so that:
G = n() =

2
(1   ): (12)
This equation describes the Laer curve the government faces. The government always chooses
the smaller tax rate to nance any given spending. The tax rate max = 1
2, which yields the
maximum tax income, is independent of the parameter . In contrast, the maximum funds
that the government can raise depend on  and government intervention can only be nanced
if G  Gmax = 
8. In what follows we assume that this condition holds and each country can
nance a domestic bail-out. In order to facilitate the notation, we let (G) denote the tax rate
that has to be set if the government wants to collect G. Furthermore, we dene Z(G) as the
total utility loss in terms of consumption due to distortionary taxation. As discussed before,
for a tax rate of zero this eect is normalized to 0. Thus, for  > 0, this utility loss is strictly
positive and is given by:
Z(G) =  



























where we substituted, in the second line of the expression, the optimal labor supply and tax
rate, which are functions of G.9 If the government decides to intervene and to bail out the
bank, then early consumers receive the promised amount  d1, while late consumer receive a pro
rata share of the bank asset left at date t = 2. The latter, amount b, depends on how much
liquidity was provided by the government. At the same time the government raises taxes to
nance the bail-out. Due to equal taxation, each consumer incurs the same utility loss from
9It would be sucient for Z(G) to be increasing, convex and twice continuously dierentiable. We assume a
specic functional form for illustrative purposes.
17taxation Z(G(b)) > 0, which increases with b. Welfare in the economy is then:
Vbo(b) = u(  d1   Z(G(b))) + (1   )u(b   Z(G(b))): (14)
When considering to do a bail-out, the government chooses b 2 f  d1;  d2g so as to maximize this







A necessary condition for a bail-out beyond b =  d1 to be optimal is that the utility of late
consumers is increasing in b, thus 1 Z0(G(b))G0(b) must be positive. In the two corner solutions
b =  d1 and b =  d2, the FOC does not need to hold. We assume that when governments are
indierent between intervention and no intervention, they do not intervene, hence a government
chooses a bail-out if Vbo(b) > Vn, where b is the solution to 15.
There is a notable dierence between a partial bail-out where just enough liquidity is provided
as to avoid bankruptcy and a bail-out where liquidity is provided beyond the minimum required
amount G(  d1). From Equations 9 and 14 for a partial bail-out to be optimal, we must have
that d1   Z(G(  d1)) > q. A partial bail-out, if chosen by the government, thus implies a Pareto
improvement. Any liquidity that is provided beyond b =  d1 benets only late depositors, while
early depositors face a higher tax rate and thus a higher disutility from work. This can be
optimal, because the utility gain from increasing late depositors' pay-os may be bigger than
the early consumers' utility loss. However, moving from partial bail-out to any other degree of
bail-out never implies a Pareto improvement.10
Proposition 1 Any additional liquidity provided beyond the amount required for a partial bail-
out redistributes resources among agents, but does not induce a Pareto improvement.
Proof. Omitted.
Whether no intervention or a bail-out yields higher welfare depends crucially on the curvature
of the utility function and the function Z(:). They determine the trade-o a government faces.
With changes in parameters, pay-os are modied. Such changes may also imply that the
bankruptcy conditions no longer hold. Assume in the following that the bankruptcy conditions
10This would not be the case if the government could tax early and late consumers dierently.
18continue to hold. From Equations 9 and 14 we see that an increase in the return on the long
asset decreases the costs of a bail-out and increases pay-os to late consumers, therein raising the
overall welfare level from a bail-out relative to no intervention. Thus the incentives to intervene
increase in R. The impact of the liquidation rate r on the optimal government intervention
is ambiguous. A bigger loss from early liquidation decreases welfare levels for all forms of
intervention. Relative changes depend on the exact parameter values.
The investment in the short asset y, decided upon at date t = 0, implicitly impacts the
government decision as well. The welfare level given no intervention depends on the liquidation
value of the bank, which is a function of y. The higher the amount invested in the short asset,
the higher the liquidation value of the bank, the higher welfare if there is no intervention by
the government. Moreover, y aects the costs of a bail-out. A higher y corresponds to a higher
pay-o  d1 promised to early consumers. Thus, liquidity needs or the gap increase with y as well.
2.6 Dierences across banks and countries
The analysis in the previous section is valid for both countries and points out the trade-os that
each government faces within its own country when deciding on intervention. Now we analyze
in more detail the dierences between the two countries, which can lead to dierent optimal
decisions of the governments. Country A is the source of the crisis. Its domestic bank faces
an additional unexpected amount of early depositors . We call Country A therefore the crisis
country. Bankruptcy of Bank A causes bankruptcy of Bank B. Therefore, we call Country B
the aected country. Each government can decide to intervene or to bail-out the bank within its
jurisdiction. Besides the direct eect of a bail-out on domestic welfare, there is a spillover eect
on the welfare of the other country. This is due to the fact that banks are connected through
interbank deposits. However the spillover eects of a bail-out are asymmetric and dier between
the crisis country and the aected country. A bail-out of Bank A avoids contagion and saves
Bank B. In contrast, a bail-out of Bank B increases the liquidation value of Bank A as interbank
deposits are fully repaid. Figure 1 illustrates the setup and linkages of our model.
As a consequence of the dierent sources of bankruptcy across banks, bail-out costs dier
between countries. Equation 10 is valid for both countries, but the gap and  dier. From
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Figure 1: Model setup
Equation 7, the explicit bail-out costs for Bank A are:
GA(b) =   d1   r

(1   y)  




For Bank B, we have from Equation 8 that:
GB(b) = z(  d1   ^ q)   r






While bankruptcy of Bank A is caused by unexpected liquidity needs creating a maturity mis-
match, the reason for bankruptcy of Bank B lies in a real loss of assets.11 In Country A, more
individuals want to consume early. Funds however have been invested in the long asset at date
11Suppose a government can raise non-discriminatory lump-sum taxes. Then, Country A would always prefer
a bail-out over no intervention as there is a pure liquidity problem. The free-riding problem, though, remains
and therefore no clear preference by Country A of a bail-out of Bank A compared to a bail-out of Bank B can
be established. Bank B faces real losses in assets. Therefore, a bail-out of Bank B is desirable if the liquidation
loss that can be avoided exceeds resources that have to be provided for the bail-out. It can be shown that this is
always the case. We derive these results on lump-sum taxation in the Appendix.
20t = 0. By providing funds, the government can avoid liquidation costs and due to the smaller
fraction of late depositors can implicitly collect some return on the long asset. Given the same
gap, a bail-out is cheaper in Country A.12 Another dierence between countries lies in the frac-
tion of early and late depositors. Due to the exogenous shock, Bank A faces a larger fraction
of early depositors  + . Therefore, the government of Country A puts more weight on the
welfare of early consumers than the government of Country B, where early consumers represent
only a fraction of . Due to asymmetric bail-out costs and dierent fractions of early and late
depositors, the optimal decision between no intervention and bail-out as well as the choice of b
typically dier between governments.
We state the welfare levels of each country separately. They depend on the actions taken by
both governments. We denote welfare of country j by U
j
sA;sB, where the rst subscript stands for
Country A's intervention decision, while the second subscripts captures the action of Country
B. We subsume the pair of actions taken by both countries by a. The general welfare function




1(a)) + (1   j)u(c
j
2(a;b)) (18)
If neither country intervenes, all agents receive a pro rata share of the liquidation value of
the bank. Each consumer, no matter in which bank it deposited its endowment, obtains  q as
interbank claims oset each other:
V A
n;n = V B
n;n = u( q): (19)
If the government of the crisis country decides to bail-out its domestic bank, then contagion is
avoided and the bank in Country B remains unaected by the crisis in Country A. Welfare of
Country A from bailing out its bank is:
V A
bo;n(b) = ( + )u(  d1   Z(GA(b))) + (1      )u(b   Z(GA(b))); (20)
12As the share of late consumers is smaller than expected given the shock, the government in Country A could
raise the return of late consumers beyond the expected level  d2 by providing funds in order for b >  d2. If the
government could provide the funds conditional on becoming a residual claimant of the bank, it could collect the
residual value of the bank after it has paid  d2 to all late consumers, thereby potentially increasing eciency. By
restricting b 2 f  d1;  d2g in the optimization problem of the government, we do not consider this case.
21where GA(b) is given by Equation 16. As there is no contagion and Bank B remains unaected,
there is no scope for intervention and Country B's welfare attains the maximum:
V B
bo;n = u(  d1) + (1   )u(  d2): (21)
However, if Country A does not intervene, there is contagion and the government of Country B
has to decide whether or not to intervene. If Country B does a bail-out, Country A's welfare is
raised compared to the case where both banks go bankrupt. This is because, as Bank B is saved
and does not go bankrupt, it is able to pay the full amount of the interbank claims. Instead
of a pro rata share of Bank B's liquidation value, Bank A now obtains z  d1. Thus Bank A's
liquidation value increases to qA = ^ q =
y+r(1 y)+z  d1
1+z >  q and welfare of Country A is given by:
V A
n;bo = u(^ q): (22)
The welfare level of the aected country, if it does a bail-out, is:
V B
n;bo(b) = u(  d1   Z(GB(b))) + (1   )u(b   Z(GB(b))); (23)
where GB(b) is given by Equation 17. Note that the bail-out of Bank B has a positive feedback
eect on itself. Because Bank B does not go bankrupt, it can fully repay Bank A's claims. This
in turn, raises the liquidation value of Bank A, of which Bank B receives a pro rata share.
3 Centralized versus decentralized decision-making
In this section, we study and compare possible equilibria given decentralized and centralized
decision making, respectively. This, in turn, allows us to evaluate the role of government coop-
eration in times of international banking crisis. As a benchmark, we consider the decentralized
solution with strategic interaction between governments, where governments play a sequential
bail-out game. Then, we introduce a central authority with the power to mandate actions to be
taken by both governments. We analyze whether and to what extent this central authority can
improve upon the non-cooperative equilibrium.13
13In the Appendix, we study the game with simultaneous moves by the governments.
223.1 Non-cooperative bail-out game
When there is no coordination, each government decides on its own whether and how to inter-
vene. Strategic interaction arises as welfare from each form of government intervention depends
on the action of the other government. Note that the welfare level of each country, however,
is independent of the liquidity that is provided for a bail-out of the foreign bank. Therefore, b
is not a strategic variable. The bail-out game in extensive form is illustrated in Figure 2. The
set of strategies of the government in Country A is given by SA = fn;bog and in Country B by
SB = fn;bog. We consider subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies of the game with
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Figure 2: Bail-out game in extensive form
sequential moves. The crisis country moves rst and the aected country is the follower.
Denition 2 The prole a  (sA;sB) is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the
game described in Figure 2 i
(i) the government in Country B maximizes its domestic welfare, given the strategy of Country
A, i.e. V B(a)  V B(sB;sA) 8sB 2 SB,
(ii) the government in Country A maximizes its domestic welfare, given the strategy of Country
B, i.e. V A(a)  V A(sA;sB) 8sA 2 SA,
23(iii) and a is a Nash equilibrium in every proper subgame.
There are three possible equilibria of the sequential game. In the following we state conditions
under which each of these three possible outcomes of the game occurs:
Proposition 2 (i) a = (n;n) is a SPNE i V B
n;bo  V B
n;n and V A
bo;n  V A
n;n.
(ii) a = (n;bo) is a SPNE i V B
n;bo > V B
n;n and V A
bo;n  V A
n;bo.
(iii) a = (bo;n) is a SPNE i V A
bo;n > V A
n;bo or V B
n;bo  V B
n;n and V A
bo;n > V A
n;n.
Proof. Note that, from Equations 19 to 23 it follows that V A
n;bo > V A
n;n and V B
bo;n > V B
n;n as well
as V B
bo;n > V B
n;bo and V B
bo;n = V B
bo;bo.
3.2 Central authority with mandating power
Now we derive the optimal decision of a central authority with a mandate to decide upon
intervention. As before, three possible pairs of actions a are possible: no intervention of both
countries (n,n), bail-out of Bank A (bo;n) or bail-out of Bank B (n;bo). The objective function
of the central authority is the weighed sum of national welfare levels. Attributing welfare weight












The pair of actions which maximizes this objective is denoted by a0. It is not necessary for
the central authority to have the power to mandate b as governments automatically choose the
optimal degree of the bail-out (see Equation 15).
Bail-out costs dier between banks. Therefore, although a bail-out of Bank A prevents
contagion and raises Country B's welfare to the maximum, a bail-out of Bank A does not
necessarily dominate a bail-out of Bank B. If GA(b) is suciently large, the optimal solution
to the central authority's problem can imply saving Bank B only. Therefore, without any
restrictions on parameters, any of the three possible combinations of government actions can be
optimal.
243.3 Ineciencies in the bail-out game
We compare the solution of the central authority with mandating power with the equilibrium
of the sequential game. For this we assume that the welfare weights attributed to each country
are the same. In a rst step we study relations between outcomes of the sequential game and
decisions taken by the central authority. Proposition 3 states which actions can be the solution
to Expression 24 for a given equilibrium of the sequential game:
Proposition 3 (i) If the SPNE is a = (bo;n), then this equilibrium coincides with the optimal
solution of the central authority a0.
(ii) If the SPNE is a = (n;bo), then a0 2 f(bo;n);(n;bo)g.
(iii) If the SPNE is a = (n;n), then a0 2 f(bo;n);(n;bo);(n;n)g.
Proof. See the Appendix.
If (bo;n) is the SPNE, a central authority chooses the same outcome. However, when (n;bo)
is the SPNE, a bail-out of Bank A or Bank B can be optimal. Finally, all actions can be optimal
to be mandated when (n;n) is the equilibrium.14
Next, we consider the relations in the opposite direction and ask which actions can be the
equilibrium of the sequential game, if the central authority nds a certain sequence of actions
a0 optimal:
Corollary 1 (i) If a0 = (bo;n), then all actions a 2 f(bo;n);(n;bo);(n;n)g can be the SPNE
of the bail-out game.
(ii) If a0 = (n;bo), then the actions a 2 f(n;bo);(n;n)g can be the SPNE of the bail-out game.
(iii) If a0 = (n;n), then a = (n;n) is the only SPNE of the bail-out game.
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 3.
First, if the central authority nds a bail-out of Bank A optimal, then all three outcomes
are possible equilibria of the sequential game and a 2 f(n;n);(n;bo);(bo;n)g. Second, if a
central authority does not nd a bail-out of Bank A optimal, then it follows that the govern-
ment in Country A itself does not choose to bail-out its domestic bank either. Finally, if the
14The situation in which the bankruptcy condition of Country B, Condition 8, holds and a
0 = (bo;n) can be
interpreted as representing the case of "too big to fail". While saving Bank A might not be optimal per se, i.e.
only taking into account eects on Bank A depositors, a bail-out of Bank A might be optimal when the potential
failure of Bank B is taken into account, too.
25central authority nds that no country should intervene, then a = (n;n) is also the SPNE
of the sequential game. This follows from the fact that for the central authority to choose no
intervention, we must have u( q) > V A
bo;n and u( q) > V B
n;bo, a situation in which neither Country
A nor Country B choose a bail-out.
Note that all distortions are towards to little intervention. If no intervention is optimal in
both countries, there is no bail-out in the non-cooperative equilibrium. It is only possible that
the "wrong" bank is the subject of the bail-out in that a bail-out of Bank B is implemented
although a bail-out of Bank A maximizes overall welfare. Suboptimal decisions in the form of
a 6= a0 only occur if a central authority nds a bail-out optimal and if Country A does not
choose a bail-out in the bail-out game.
When comparing decisions in the sequential game with those taken by a central authority
with mandating power, two sources of ineciencies can be identied. First, due to the interbank
linkages, there are spillover eects (externalities), which are not taken into account by the
governments. Second, there is a free-riding problem due to the sequential nature of the bail-out
game.15 The crisis country may not bail out its domestic bank because it knows that then the
aected country will do a bail-out. As the rst mover it can free ride on the bail-out carried out
by Country B. This is captured in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 An anticipated bail-out in the aected country lowers the incentives for a bail-
out in the crisis country.
Proof. Country A does a bail-out i V A








n;n if Country B does not intervene
V A
n;bo if Country B does a bail-out;
and V A
n;bo > V A
n;n.
Given that the crisis country does not intervene, an anticipated bail-out of the aected
country raises the welfare level in the crisis country because Bank B can fully repay Bank A's
interbank claims, which raises Bank A's liquidation value. The magnitude of the eect of a
bail-out in the aected country on the crisis country is determined by the size of the interbank
15In the simultaneous bail-out game, there are multiple Nash equilibria. Instead of the free-riding problem, a
coordination problem may occur.
26deposits:
Proposition 5 (i) The incentives for a bail-out in the aected country decrease in the interbank
deposits z.
(ii) If the aected country bails out its domestic bank, then the incentives for a bail-out in the


















Interbank deposits are a function of the investment in the short asset y and the anticipated
date-0 uncertainty captured by  L. Note from Expression 17 that with increasing interbank
deposits z, a bail-out in Country B becomes more costly as the loss from bankruptcy of Bank
A grows. This makes it less attractive for the aected country to bail out its bank.
A central authority that can dictate actions internalizes the externalities and eliminates the
free-riding problem. This form of coordination can therefore improve global welfare.
4 Cross-country deposits and country sizes
In this section, we introduce cross-country deposits as an additional form of international link-
ages, i.e. banks compete for customers in both countries who can decide freely on where to
deposit their endowment. Furthermore, we allow for dierences in country size.
In the previous section, we identied two sources of ineciency that can arise in the bail-out
game: externalities due to spillovers and free-riding due to the sequential nature of the game.
As discussed, they imply that a central authority with mandating power can in some cases
improve upon the non-cooperative equilibrium. In the following, we study how the presence of
cross-country deposits and dierences in country size aect the outcome of the non-cooperative
game and the decision taken by a central authority, as well as the two sources of ineciencies.
We nd that with equal country sizes the incentives to free ride, in general, decrease in the share
of cross-border deposit holdings. The optimal choice of b decreases in the size of cross-country
deposits. Finally, asymmetric country sizes aect optimal decisions as they imply dierent tax
distortions given the same level of government expenditures.
274.1 Extended model setup
Spillover effect: 
bankruptcy of Bank B 
Spillover effect:  
lower liquidation value 










Bail out A at costs G








1- λ-ε late 


















1- λ late 
Figure 3: Extended model setup
The modied setup with cross-country deposits is illustrated in Figure 4. Let  () denote
the fraction of depositors of Bank A (Bank B) that live in Country A (Country B) and let
(1 ) ((1 )) denote the fraction of agents that are depositors of Bank A (Bank B) that live
in Country B (Country A).16 Banks remain of equal size, each hosting a unit mass of deposits.
We assume that the liquidity shock  hits a bank.17 Therefore, bail-out costs G are independent
of the distribution of depositors. However, how easily a bail-out can be nanced depends on the
tax base of a country, hence its size. The smaller the population, the higher the tax rate required
to raise the funds for a bail-out, the higher the distortion. Countries dier in size if  6= . The
population of Country A is PA =  + (1   ). In Country B it is PB =  + (1   ). With
16Ex-ante agents are indierent where to deposit their endowments. We assume that each agent deposits its
entire endowment either abroad or at home.
17An alternative would be a shock hitting a country. This would lead to shocks in form of additional early
depositors in both banks, i.e.  in Bank A and (1   ) in Bank B for the case where the shock hits nationals
of Country A.
28asymmetric country sizes, the disutility from work becomes country-specic and depends on the



















Cross-country deposits change the bail-out game in three ways. Firstly, governments now take
the spillover eects into account because they care about domestic consumers that invested
abroad. The intervention has, through the spillover, a direct impact on their pay-os. Secondly,
the amount of liquidity b that is provided by a government enters the welfare function of the
other country. Without cross-country deposits, a country's welfare was only impacted by the
bail-out decision that the other country took and not by b. Nevertheless, b is as before not a
strategic variable.18 When deciding upon an action, each government takes the optimal b of
the other country as given. Thirdly, as liquidity shocks are attributed to a bank rather than
a country, the fraction of early and late depositors of each country in State  S is altered. The
fraction of early depositors in Country A is reduced and is only ( + ) + (1   ), while the
equivalent fraction in Country B is increased and is (1   )( + ) + . As a consequence the
welfare weights that are attributed to early and late consumers are modied.
The derivation of the pay-os of the bail-out game with cross-country deposits is straight-
forward. If both countries do not take any action, total welfare of Country-A agents is
V A
n;n = u( q) + (1   )u( q): (26)
For Country B we have equivalently:
V B
n;n = (1   )u( q) + u( q): (27)
If both countries are of equal size, then both expressions reduce to Equation 19. If Country A
18Consider two possible cases. i) If country A does a bail-out, then there is no action by Country B. ii) If
Country B does a bail-out, there is no strategic eect as it is the second mover without commitment power.




( + )u(  d1   ZA(GA(b))) + (1      )u(b   ZA(GA(b)))

+ (28)
+ (1   )

u(  d1   ZA(GA(b))) + (1   )u(  d2   ZA(GA(b)))

Country B benets from the bail-out in Country A because rstly, there is no need for interven-
tion as contagion is avoided, and secondly, because domestic consumers that deposited in Bank
A receive higher pay-os than under bankruptcy, namely the ones expected at date t = 0. The
welfare in Country B is:
V B
bo;n(b) = (1   )





u(  d1) + (1   )u(  d2)

: (29)
If Country A does not intervene but Country B bails out its bank, welfare in Country A is:
V A
n;bo(b) = u(^ q) + (1   )

u(  d1) + (1   )u(b)

: (30)
Utility of Country-A consumers is positively impacted when Country B bails out its bank. In
addition to domestic consumers holding deposits abroad, agents having invested domestically
benet through the positive eect of the bail-out on the liquidation value of Bank A as ^ q >  q.
Welfare in Country B is:
V B
n;bo(b) = (1 )u(^ q ZB(GB(b)))+

u(  d1   ZB(GB(b))) + (1   )u(b   ZB(GB(b)))

: (31)
Proposition 2 also pins down the equilibrium with cross-country deposits.
4.2 Cross-country deposits, country sizes and ineciencies
To continue with, we analyze which impact cross-country deposits and dierences in country
size have on the decision of the central authority, the outcome of the non-cooperative game and
the two sources of ineciencies discussed before. If the central authority gives equal weight to
every consumer and country sizes are equal, cross-country deposits do not change its problem.
Dierences in country size, in contrast, have an eect as they imply dierent tax bases and thus
country-specic tax distortions. Cross-country deposits also aect the decision by each country
30on how much liquidity to provide in a bail-out.19 Due to the fact that not all domestic agents
deposit in the domestic bank, an additional unit of liquidity has a lower marginal contribution
to national welfare and b will be lower than without cross-country deposits:
Proposition 6 For a given country size, the smaller the fraction of domestically held deposits,
the lower the optimal liquidity b provided by the government in case of a bail-out.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Furthermore, cross-country deposits have an impact on the non-cooperative outcome. As
the incentives for bail-outs change, the extent of the free-riding problem changes as well. For
equally sized countries, the eects can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Suppose countries are of equal size ( = ). Then, an increase in the fraction
of deposits abroad
(i) decreases the incentives for a bail-out in the aected country.
(ii) increases the incentives for a bail-out in the crisis country if it anticipates no bail-out in the
aected country.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The incentives for Country B to do a bail-out decrease with the fraction of deposits abroad.
This is the case because the direct eect of a bail-out on consumers who have invested do-
mestically is larger than the indirect eect of a bail-out on domestic deposit holdings abroad
through the rise in the liquidation value of Bank A. While a partial bail-out raises pay-os by
 d1    q for Bank-B depositors, the increase for Bank-A depositors is only a fraction of that,
^ q    q = z
1+z(  d1    q). If b >  d1, late consumers that invested domestically benet more than
early consumers, while the additional liquidity support does not impact the pay-o to consumers
that invested abroad.
If Country A anticipates that Country B will not bail out its bank, then the incentives of
Country A to do a bail-out increase with the fraction of domestic deposits abroad. A bail-out
in Country A can avoid contagion and has therefore a large eect on the pay-os to Country-A
consumers that invested abroad. With a growing fraction of domestic endowments deposited
19If the central authority could also mandate b, this could improve welfare as it would take the externalities
from the liquidity provision into account.
31in Bank B, the benets from a bail-out increase for Country A. This is due to the fact that a
partial bail-out in Country A is enough to guarantee that late depositors that invested in Bank
B receive the originally promised amount  d2. In order to induce the same welfare of domestic
depositors, costs are lower when we have  > 0. Therefore, given Country B is not willing
to bail-out its bank, the incentives of the government in Country A for a bail-out of Bank A
increase in .
If Country A anticipates that there will be a bail-out in Country B, then the eect of the
fraction of deposits held abroad on its incentives to bail-out Bank A is ambiguous. The welfare
of Country A from a domestic bail-out increases with the fraction of agents that have invested
abroad. At the same time, however, the benets for Country-A depositors from a bail-out of
Bank B by Country B increase. How the optimal decision changes with  is ambiguous. If there
is a bail-out of Bank B, then early depositors of Bank B receive  d1, while late depositors get the
pay-o b. If Country A avoids contagion incurring cost GA(b), then late consumers of Country
A with endowments in Bank B receive the full promised return  d2. Therefore, a bail-out by
Country A can be optimal as it can result in a higher return for its late depositors that invested
in Bank B. The exact eect of an increase in domestic Bank-B depositors on the decision of
Country A therefore depends on the bail-out costs and the optimal bail-out level chosen by
Country B. Clearly, the lower the liquidity provided to Bank B by Government B, the lower the
pay-o to late depositors of Bank B, the higher the incentive of Government A to bail out its
domestic bank in order to avoid contagion.
Next, we study the eect of country size. For the special case where 50% of consumers in
each country hold deposits abroad, the following proposition can be stated:
Proposition 8 Suppose countries hold an equal share of deposits at home and abroad ( =
1   ). Then, holding b constant,
(i) the incentives for a bail-out in the crisis country increases with its size (),
(ii) the incentives for a bail-out in the aected country increases with its size ().
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the model country size corresponds to the size of the tax base. If  is bigger than , the
crisis country is bigger than the aected country. As a consequence, to cover the same costs of
intervention, the necessary tax rate and therefore distortions from taxation are lower in the crisis
country than in the aected country. This makes a bail-out in the crisis country relatively more
32attractive. At the same time, the free-riding problem is smaller, as a bail-out in the aected
country is less likely if its tax base is smaller.
So far we have isolated the eects of cross-country deposits and dierences in country sizes.
For other combinations of parameters, these two eects interact. We nd that, whether cross-
country deposits tend to reinforce ineciencies or alleviate them, depends on the nature of the
asymmetry between countries.
If 1      > 1     , then the crisis country is larger than the aected country and
the majority of domestic agents holds deposits abroad. The size of the crisis country increases
Government A's willingness to nance a bail-out. The fact that most of the domestic endowments
are deposited abroad reinforces the positive eect of size because by bailing out Bank A domestic
consumers that invested abroad are saved at the same time while the small tax base of Country
B makes a bail-out there unlikely.
If 1      > 1     , then the situation is the other way around. The crisis country is
smaller than the aected country, but still the majority of depositors in the domestic bank are
foreigners. In this case, it will be dicult for Country A to nance a bail-out of its domestic
bank due to the small tax base. At the same time, it is easier for Country B to nance the
bail-out of Bank B due to the larger size of the country. By a bail-out of Bank B, in turn, the
majority of the deposits of Country A, which are abroad, is saved, and through this indirect
eect, the incentives for bail-out in Country A can decrease.
5 Fiscal burden sharing
In the context of the European initiative toward a new nancial architecture, it has been argued
that scal burden sharing is required for ecient crisis management (see for example De Larosiere
Report (2009)). In this section, we consider a central authority with mandating and scal
power, i.e. it can now decide on the action to be taken and set a contribution to be nanced by
each country. We study how the new instrument of scal burden sharing can improve eciency
compared to the non-cooperative outcome. As discussed, a central authority without scal power
can improve global welfare by mandating the ecient actions as this removes the ineciencies
due to externalities and free-riding. Introducing burden sharing can further improve upon the
equilibrium allocation.
33Without joint nancing, there is an ineciency due to no burden sharing, which comes
from the convexity of function Z(:) due to labor distortions. A bail-out becomes cheaper in
utility terms when it is nanced by both countries because these distortions are reduced. Now,
even if the optimal actions prescribed by a central authority coincide with the outcome of
the sequential game, i.e. a = a0, a situation in which the central authority without scal
power could not improve upon the equilibrium global welfare, the central authority now brings
an improvement by implementing optimal burden sharing. The possibility of burden sharing
increases the number of cases in which a bail-out is desirable. That is there are cases in which a
central authority without scal power may decide for no intervention, while a central authority
with scal power may choose to mandate a bail-out. Compared to the optimal solution chosen
by a central authority with scal power, the equilibrium of the sequential game is, as before,
distorted towards too little intervention and Proposition 3 remains valid.
No cross-country deposits We start with an analysis of the problem of a central authority
with scal power when there are no cross-country deposits. The central authority decides upon
an intervention and a burden sharing rule. If a bail-out is optimal, the authority chooses
the bail-out level b and the country-specic contributions XA and XB such that the sum of
the contributions equals the funds required for the bail-out G(a,b), where G(a,b) is given by
Equation 16 if a = (bo;n) or by Equation 17 if a = (n;bo). We restrict contributions to be
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34By setting contribution levels, the central authority can induce discriminatory taxation. On
the one hand, disutilities from labor taxation, which in our setup are independent of individ-
ual income levels, prescribe an equalization of contribution levels between countries, i.e. tax
smoothing. On the other hand, dierences in income levels between countries, resulting from
asymmetric eects of the banking crisis, give rise to a consumption smoothing motive. Thus,
a central authority trades o a tax smoothing and a consumption smoothing motive. Given a
banking crisis, Country A is always poorer than Country B. Due to this fact, we can derive the
following result regarding contribution levels:
Proposition 9 Suppose countries have the same welfare weights. Then, under a central au-
thority with scal power, the contribution for a bail-out XB of the aected country will be larger
than the contribution XA of the crisis country .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that the ability to induce discriminatory taxes is an additional instrument in the in-
ternational context, which is not available in a national crisis. Imagine a closed economy model
where the two countries integrate and form one country with one government. Then the maxi-
mization problem of the government that hosts both Banks A and B is the same as the problem
of the central authority stated above with the exception that the government cannot set dis-
criminatory taxes, i.e. there is perfect tax-smoothing. The depositors of each bank have to bear
the same distortion from taxation and XA = XB = G(a;b)=2. As consumers have dierent
pay-os in case of a banking crisis, discriminatory taxation is desirable. A central authority has
thus an advantage relative to the case of full integration. The additional policy instrument of
tax discrimination allows it to attain a higher welfare level.
The central authority also chooses the degree of the bail-out b. Note that, in general, the
authority will mandate a level of liquidity provision dierent from the choice that a government
would make on its own as it can raise taxes more eciently. The central authority's rst-order
condition for b is stated in the Appendix.
With cross-country deposits The problem of the central authority changes with the intro-
duction of cross-country deposits. The relative income of the two countries depends on  and .
Cross-country deposits alter the fraction of early and late depositors each country has as well
as the pay-os to them. Moreover, the degree of the bail-out b now impacts the welfare level
35of both countries. In addition, the ability of each country to raise taxes, which is characterized
by the country-specic function Zj(:), is aected when countries dier in size. These factors
modify the consumption smoothing versus tax smoothing trade-o that a central authority with
scal power faces. Consequently, Proposition 9 does not hold with cross-country deposits.20
Unilateral nancing There is the possibility that a country may not be able to nance a
bail-out on its own, which we have ruled out so far. This is the case when the maximum tax
income it can raise is not sucient to nance the costs of a bail-out, i.e. Gmax < Gj(b). With
cross-country deposits, the relative size of banks to population is no longer bounded from above.
The size of a domestic bank can exceed the country size. This makes the case of an absolute
nancing constraint more likely.
Such a nancing constraint reduces the strategy set of the governments as well as the set of
possible equilibria. Thereby, it can improve welfare if there is a free-riding problem. If Country
B is not able to nance a bail-out, the free-riding problem simply disappears (see Appendix
E). However, it may also be desirable to circumvent a nancing constraint. If a breakdown of
the nancial system can be avoided, global welfare may be boosted by a bail-out. A central
authority with mandating power alone cannot bypass a nancing constraint as the nancial
burden between countries is not shared. Only an authority that can also set contribution levels
can make a bail-out feasible in such a situation. This implies that burden sharing becomes more
important when country sizes are very asymmetric.
6 Contracts
So far we have analyzed the non-cooperative solution and contrasted it with the outcomes
under a central planner with scal power and/or mandating power. Our focus has been on
revealing ineciencies without cooperation. In this section, we investigate an additional form
of cooperation: contracts. While a central authority corresponds to an ex-ante agreement on
how to coordinate actions during a crisis, contracts re
ect ex-post cooperation. We address the
question what contracts between governments that are signed after the crisis has occurred can
achieve compared to a central authority.
20In our setting, the ability to tax people according to the bank they deposited in could bring an improvement
when we have cross-country deposits.
36Contracts specify actions to be taken and a burden sharing rule. We model the negotiation
process between governments via Nash bargaining with symmetric negotiation power. As con-
tracts are voluntary, governments only sign a contract if doing so weakly improves their domestic
welfare level. The Nash bargaining problem is as follows:
max |{z}
a2f(n;bo);(bo;n)g;XA
(V A(a;b;XA)   V B(a))(V B(a;b;XB)   V B(a)) (34)
s:t: G(a;b) = XA + XB:
If a contract is signed, it implies a Pareto improvement compared to the non-cooperative
benchmark. One necessary condition for a Pareto improvement is that the actions ~ a that are
prescribed by the contract dier from the equilibrium actions a of the bail-out game. A con-
tract cannot be an agreement on burden sharing or a dierent degree of bail-out alone as the
participation constraint of one government would be violated. A second necessary condition is
that the country where the bail-out does not take place helps nance the bail-out in the other
country. This follows from the fact that governments maximize domestic welfare in the bail-out
game. A change in actions without compensation must therefore reduce domestic welfare of at
least one country. From these two conditions together with Proposition 3, it follows that there
are two dierent outcomes of the non-cooperative game that each allow for specic types of
contracts to be signed. We summarize our ndings in the following proposition:
Proposition 10 (i) If a = (n;n) and contracts allow for a Pareto improvement, then ~ a =
(n;bo) with ~ XA > 0 or ~ a = (bo;n) with ~ XB > 0.
(ii) If a = (n;bo) and contracts allow for a Pareto improvement, then ~ a = (bo;n) with ~ XB > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Case (i) captures situations where neither country intervenes, but welfare can be improved
by a bail-out. In order for Country B to agree on bailing out its domestic bank, Country A has
to subsidize the bail-out and vice versa. In Case (ii), Country B would bail-out its bank without
any cooperation between countries. However, each country's welfare can be increased if Bank A
instead of Bank B is bailed out and Country B subsidizes the bail-out.




( + )u0(d1(a)   Z(XA)) + (1      )u0(d2(a;b)   Z(XA))
u0(d1(a)   Z(XB)) + (1   )u0(d2(a;b)   Z(XB))
(V B(a;b;XB)   V B(a))
(V A(a;b;XA)   V B(a))
:
In a similar way, the FOC for b diers from the one of a central authority with scal power.
Every marginal utility is weighted by the other country's Nash factor. Due to diering FOC, the
action ~ a, ~ b and the burden sharing rule in form of ~ XA; ~ XB will in general not coincide with the
solution of the central authority with scal power. Whether countries are able to agree upon the
ecient actions depends on the amount of redistribution that is required by the Nash bargaining
solution. Redistribution is costly. Therefore, when countries move away from the solution of a
central authority with scal power and choose ~ Xj 6= X0j, the surplus from changing the actions
shrinks with the redistribution.
7 Winners and losers from cooperation
In this section, we consider the dierent types of cooperation discussed so far with respect to
gains and losses for individual countries and potential Pareto improvements compared to the
non-cooperative outcome. Analyzing which countries in their role as crisis or aected country
benet from the dierent types of cooperation is important for understanding their incentives
to agree on cooperation.
7.1 Central authority without scal power
The introduction of a central authority with mandating power only has an eect on the equilib-
rium if it mandates actions dierent from the ones taken in the non-cooperative game. As it has
no scal power, which would allow for burden sharing, it cannot induce Pareto improvements:
Proposition 11 Suppose no country is indierent between a bail-out and no intervention.
Then, a central authority with mandating power can only increase global welfare at the expense
of the welfare of one country. It cannot induce a Pareto improvement.
Proof.
Suppose there is no intervention by the governments or a bail-out of Bank B. Then, if the central
38authority mandates a0 = (bo;n), Country A is made worse o as V A
bo;n < maxfV A
n;bo;V A
n;ng.
Suppose there is no intervention by the governments. Then, if the central authority mandates
a0 = (n;bo), Country B is made worse o as V B
n;bo < V A
n;n.
If, in the non-cooperative equilibrium, Country A does not choose to bail-out its bank, then
if it is mandated to do so, given that there is no burden sharing, this can only deteriorate
its domestic welfare. The other country benets from this. It can also be optimal to have a
bail-out of Bank B. If Country B is mandated to do a bail-out, although in the non-cooperative
equilibrium it did not choose this option, then the decision of the central authority raises welfare
of Country A at the expense of Country B.
7.2 Central authority with scal power
The decision of a central authority with scal power implies that the welfare of one country
increases, while the other country can experience a gain or a loss in welfare. To shed some light
on this, we discuss under which conditions Pareto improvements are possible.
To start with, we consider cases where the actions taken in the non-cooperative equilibrium
coincide with the choice of the central authority. Then, the central authority only modies the
costs that each country has to bear together with b. In this case, no Pareto improvement is
possible, which we have already proven as part of Proposition 10. If Country B does a bail-out
and this is globally optimal, then burden sharing will lead to a nonnegative contribution of
Country A, XA  0, which can benet Country B but harm Country A. If instead the latter
does a bail-out, the central authority will use this instrument to implement some consumption
smoothing across countries. From Proposition 9, we know that the contribution of Country B
will be greater than zero, XB > 0. This increases welfare of Country A, but decreases welfare
of Country B.
When the central planner does not only introduce burden-sharing, but also mandates actions
dierent from the ones taken in the sequential game, this can, but does not need to imply
improvements for both countries. There are three cases where the central authority with scal
39power may coordinate on actions dierent from the ones taken in the sequential game:
(i) a = (n;n) and a0 = (n;bo);
(ii) a = (n;n) and a0 = (bo;n);
(iii) a = (n;bo) and a0 = (bo;n):
In all cases, welfare in Country B is strictly higher than in Country A. Furthermore, it can be
shown that there is a strictly positive net gain for Country B due to the introduction of a central
authority with scal power relative to the outcome of the sequential game for Cases (i) and (ii).
This is because both countries would have the same utility in the non-cooperative game. For
Case (iii), we nd that each country can be a net winner or loser. As GA might be larger than
GB, it is possible that XB > GB and that Country B looses welfare. These results are derived
in the Appendix.
7.3 Discussion
Table 3: Winners from cooperation
Form of Cooperation Number of Winners
Central authority without scal power 1
Central authority with scal power 1-2
Contracts 2
Table 3 summarizes the ndings of the previous sections regarding winners and losers from
the dierent forms of cooperation. Contracts imply, by their very nature, that both countries
benet. In contrast, the introduction of a central authority with mandating power only always
makes one country worse o compared to the non-cooperative outcome. A central authority
with additional scal power may be able to bring welfare improvements for both countries at
the same time, though this is not guaranteed. It can be ecient to make one country worse o.
Among the three cooperation regimes we look at, a central authority with scal power
achieves the highest overall welfare, which is our benchmark for eciency. A clear ranking
between contracts and a central authority with mandating power only, with respect to eciency,
40is not possible. A central authority with mandating power cannot alleviate the ineciency due to
no burden sharing, but can fully internalize spillover eects. While contracts allow for some form
of burden sharing, redistribution limits the overall gains that can be realized by contracts. Due
to their limitations, neither contracts nor a central authority with mandating power guarantee
the implementation of the ecient actions.
As mentioned, contracts correspond to a form of ex-post cooperation. Knowing their roles
in the bail-out game, after the realization of the third state, governments negotiate. A central
authority represents a form of ex-ante cooperation. The setup described in Table 2 identies
Country A as the crisis country and Country B as the aected country, which is a reduced
formulation in order to highlight the mechanisms in our model. We can think of a forth state
that is the mirror image of the third state, where the roles of the countries are interchanged.
In this symmetric world, each country can take the role of the crisis country or the aected
country when crisis occurs. Cooperation ex-ante takes place under uncertainty about the role
each country has in case of a crisis. In this light, the above considerations may shed some light
on the desirability and the incentives of countries to agree ex-ante on a form of cooperation.
8 Ring-fencing
Another form of government intervention, which can be observed during banking crises, is the
ring-fencing of assets, i.e. the freeze of foreign asset holdings in domestic banks. During the
current crisis, the German government froze assets of Lehman in order for domestic depositors
to be reimbursed. (See Claessens (2009).) Furthermore, in the context of the bankruptcy case
of Barings, counterparties and customers faced constraints in accessing their funds during the
resolution process. When the Bank for Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) was resolved,
California and New York ring-fenced assets in order to secure a higher share of the liquidation
value for local depositors. Ring-fencing applied to all assets up to the total value of liabilities
towards local depositors. (See Herring (2005).)
In our model, we dene ring-fencing as an asset freeze, that is foreign depositors (either a
bank or private households) that would like to withdraw early are prevented from doing so.
Governments observe the state of the world and decide on the form of intervention before any
claims are paid. Furthermore, we assume that a country only does ring-fencing if this implies a
strictly higher welfare than any alternative.
41No cross-country deposits To start with, we consider the case with interbank deposits only.
In this case, ring-fencing is equivalent to an interbank deposit freeze at date t = 1. We extend
the bail-out game as illustrated in Figure 4 and introduce the additional form of intervention
called ring-fencing. The gure is a reduced form of the game given the optimality of mutual
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Figure 4: Intervention game in extensive form
ring-fencing. We show in the Appendix that the best response to ring-fencing is ring-fencing.
Therefore, it does not matter for the pay-os to depositors and thus the welfare levels of the
countries which country chooses to ring-fence interbank deposits rst. As interbank claims
exactly oset each other, ring-fencing cannot prevent bankruptcy in Country A. Bank A has to
be liquidated and the welfare level of Country A is the same as in the case where neither country
intervenes:
V A
rf;rf = V A
n;rf;rf = u( q): (36)
In contrast, ring-fencing has a positive eect on the welfare level of Country B. Because interbank
claims net out, contagion is avoided and welfare of Country B attains the st-best:
V B
rf;rf = V B
n;rf;rf = u(  d1) + (1   )u(  d2): (37)
42The following result on optimal strategies can be derived:
Proposition 12 In the non-cooperative game without cross-country deposits, the crisis country
never chooses to ring-fence assets although this could avoid contagion. Without any costs to
ring-fencing, the aected country will always choose this option.
Proof. See the Appendix.
As Country B always chooses to ring-fence foreign assets in order to avoid contagion, the
number of SPNE reduces to the following two:
Proposition 13 (i) a = (n;rf;rf) is a SPNE i V A
bo;n  V A
n;rf;rf.
(ii) a = (bo;n) is a SPNE i V A
bo;n > V A
n;rf;rf.
Proof. Omitted.
We compare the SPNE of the game with the possible choices of a central authority with
mandating power only:
Proposition 14 (i) If the SPNE is a = (bo;n), then this equilibrium coincides with the optimal
solution of the central authority with mandating power a0.
(ii) If the SPNE is a = (n;rf;rf), then a0 2 f(n;rf;rf);(n;bo)g.
Proof. See the Appendix.
As burden sharing makes bail-outs less costly, a central authority with scal power may nd
a bail-out of Bank A optimal. Therefore, in Case (ii) the set of possibly ecient actions given
scal burden sharing changes to a0 2 f(n;rf;rf);(n;bo);(bo;n)g. In the modied game, there
is only scope for one specic type of contract as dened in Expression 34 because Country B
always attains the maximum welfare level: ~ a = (n;bo) with XA = GB(  d2) and XB = 0, i.e.
Country A fully nances the bail-out of Bank B.
So far we have abstracted from any costs that ring-fencing might have. Yet, one can imagine
that a country, which ring-fences assets, could be punished for its behavior, for example through
the exclusion from the international interbank market in the future. Suppose the country that
ring-fences suers from a utility loss due to some penalty. Then ring-fencing may be no longer
the dominant strategy of Country B. The severity of the punishment determines whether ring-
fencing initiated by Country B is observed in equilibrium. Punishment could also be endogenous,
giving an additional role to cooperation.
43With cross-country deposits With cross-country deposits, the scope for ring-fencing in-
creases. Countries can freeze interbank assets as well as private assets. The motivation of a
government for ring-fencing becomes twofold. As before, freezing deposits prevents the with-
drawal of assets, thereby eventually alleviating the liquidity problem at date t = 1 and preventing
contagion. Moreover, by ring-fencing assets, a government can change the de-facto seniority of
claims. It allows for a compensation of domestic depositors at the expense of foreigners. When
a large fraction of assets deposited in the domestic bank is owned by foreigners, the incentives to
ring-fence may therefore increase. It is crucial whether governments can discriminate between
interbank and private deposits and freeze these assets independently of each other.
9 Conclusions
The nancial system is more and more linked internationally. This has important implications
for international crises and corresponding interventions by governments. We provide a model
of contagion in an international setting with endogenous bail-out decisions. We study eciency
properties under dierent forms of cooperation in contrast to the non-cooperative outcome,
identify winners and losers and point out factors that make cooperation more important.
Among the three dierent cooperation regimes we consider, a central authority with man-
dating and scal power achieves the highest overall welfare. A central authority with mandating
power only can improve the global welfare as well, but to a lesser extent. Decisions by both
types of central authority do not imply gains for both countries, i.e. Pareto improvements.
While under contracts an agreement always implies a Pareto improvement, ex-post negotiations
between governments can fall short on global eciency both in terms of actions chosen and in
terms of burden-sharing.
The model provides a framework to understand potential gains and losses for dierent coun-
tries from dierent cooperation regimes. In this regard, it can help guide current policy reforms
like the one by the European Commission and provide some intuition for the negotiation pro-
cesses. An important result of our analysis is that with equal country sizes larger cross-country
deposit holdings improve the non-cooperative equilibrium. Therefore, cross-border deposit hold-
ings by consumers can have positive eects by reducing externalities and free-riding problems.
Another relevant aspect highlighted by our model is the case of asymmetric country sizes. The
potential need for a bail-out at some point in time implies that it might be good to limit the
44ratio of the nancial sector of a country to its population, that is the tax base, when there is no
ex-ante cooperation in crisis management.
The model may be a suitable framework to study other aspects of bail-outs. While we
consider scal bail-outs, banks could also be saved through a bail-out nanced by monetary
policy where central banks are left to pick-up the bail-out bill. This would entail dierent
trade-os as e.g. the labor-leisure choice might be distorted by in
ation.
45Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof.
(i) a = (bo;n) i V A
bo;n > V A
n;bo or V B
n;bo  V B
n;n and V A
bo;n > V A
n;n:
If V A
bo;n > V A
n;bo; using V B
bo;n > V B
n;bo ) V A
bo;n + V B
bo;n > V A
n;bo + V B
n;bo:
Using V A
n;bo > V A
n;n and V B
bo;n > V B
n;n ) V A
bo;n + V B
bo;n > V A
n;n + V B
n;n:
If V A
bo;n > V A
n;n and V B
n;n  V B
n;bo ) V A
bo;n + V B
n;n > V A
n;n + V B
n;bo:
Using V B
bo;n   V B
n;n > V A
n;bo   V A
n;n ) V A
bo;n + V B
bo;n > V A
n;bo + V B
n;bo;
and as V B
bo;n > V B
n;n ) V A
bo;n + V B
bo;n > V A
n;n + V B
n;n:
(ii) a = (n;bo) i V B
n;bo > V B
n;n and V A
bo;n  V A
n;bo:
As V A
n;bo > V A
n;n ) V A
n;bo + V B
n;bo > V A
n;n + V B
n;n:
(iii) a = (n;n) i V B
n;bo  V B
n;n and V A
bo;n  V A
n;n: ) V A
bo;n  V A
n;n < V A
n;bo;
and V B
n;bo  V B
n;n < V B
bo;n;
which implies that in case (iii) no general statement can be made on actions maximizing global
welfare.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. With constant country size implying  P  = (1 ), the rst-order condition of Country
A for b implies:
( + )u0(  d1   Z(G(b))) + (  P   )[u0(  d1   Z(G(b))) + (1   )u0(  d2   Z(G(b)))]





46The derivative of the left hand side (LHS) with respect to , holding b constant, implies:
@LHS

jb= b[(1      )u0(b   Z(G(b)))]2
= [( + )u0(  d1   Z(G(b)))   u0(  d1   Z(G(b)))   (1   )u0(  d2   Z(G(b)))]
(1      )u0(b   Z(G(b)))
  [( + )u0(  d1   Z(G(b))) + (  P   )[u0(  d1   Z(G(b)))
+ (1   )u0(  d2   Z(G(b)))](1      )u0(b   Z(G(b)))]
=  [u0(  d1   Z(G(b))) + (1   )u0(  d2   Z(G(b)))](1      )u0(b   Z(G(b)))
  (  P   )[u0(  d1   Z(G(b))) + (1   )u0(  d2   Z(G(b)))](1      )u0(b   Z(G(b))) < 0:
The derivative of the LHS with respect to b implies:
@LHS
b
((1      )u0(b   Z(G(b))))2
=  ( + )u0(  d1   Z(G(b))) + (  P   )[u0(  d1   Z(G(b))) + (1   )u0(  d2   Z(G(b)))]
(1      )u00(b   Z(G(b))) > 0:
The derivative of Z0(G(b))G0(b) with respect to b is:
@Z0(G(b))G0(b)
b
= Z00(G(b))(G0(b))2 + Z0(G(b))G00(b) = Z00(G(b))(G0(b))2 > 0:
Therefore, the derivative of the right hand side (RHS) with respect to b is negative. The
statements on the derivatives above imply that an increase in  leads to a higher bailout level
b being chosen by the government in Country A. The proof for Country B is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof.
(i) Country B does a bail-out i V B
n;bo > V B
n;n. Now:
@(V B
n;bo   V B
n;n)
@(1   )
jb= b = u(^ q   Z(G(b)))  

u( (d1)   Z(G(b))) + (1   )u(b   Z(G(b)))

< 0
) 8;0 2 [0;1] and 8b 2 [  d1;  d2] : 0 >  , V B
n;bo(b;0) > V B
n;bo(b;):
47Let b = argmaxV B
n;bo(b;) and b0 = argmaxV B
n;bo(b;0) with 0 > . Then, from optimal
behavior of Country B and above: V B
n;bo(b0;0)  V B
n;bo(b;0) > V B
n;bo(b;).
(ii) Country A does a bail-out i V A
bo;n > V A
n;n. Now:
@(V A
bo;n   V A
n;n)
@(1   )
jb= b =  





u(  d1   ZA(GA(b))) + (1   )u(  d2   ZA(GA(b)))

> 0
) 8;0 2 [0;1] and 8b 2 [  d1;  d2] :  > 0 , V A
bo;n(b;0) > V A
bo;n(b;):
Let b = argmaxV A
bo;n(b;) and b0 = argmaxV A
bo;n(b;0) with  > 0. Then, from optimal
behavior of Country A and above: V A
bo;n(b0;0)  V A
bo;n(b;0) > V A
bo;n(b;).
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof.


















Holding b constant, we have:
@ZA
@





































(2 + )u(  d1   Z(GA(b))) + (1      )u(b   Z(GA(b))) + (1   )u(  d2   Z(GA(b)))

























(2 + )u0(  d1   Z(GA(b))) + (1      )u0(b   Z(GA(b))) + (1   )u0(  d2   Z(GA(b)))







jb= b > 0:


















Holding b constant, we have:
@ZB
@














































jb= b > 0:
49Proof of Proposition 9
Proof.
(1) Interior solution, where Condition 33 holds. For the case (n,bo), we have:
1 =
u0(  d1   Z(XB)) + (1   )u0(b   Z(XB))







Suppose that XA  XB. Then:
u0(  d1   Z(XB)) + (1   )u0(b   Z(XB))  u0(^ q   Z(XA))
) u0(  d1   Z(XB))  u0(^ q   Z(XA))
) Z(XB)   Z(XA)   d1   ^ q > 0
) XB > XA;
which is a contradiction. Therefore, XB > XA.
For the case (bo,n), we have:
1 =
u0(  d1   Z(XB)) + (1   )u0(  d2   Z(XB))







Suppose that XA  XB. Then, given b 2 [  d1;  d2]:
u0(  d1   Z(XB)) + (1   )u0(  d2   Z(XB))  ( + )u0(  d1   Z(XA)) + (1      )u0(b   Z(XA))
) u0(  d1   Z(XB)) + (1   )u0(  d2   Z(XB))  ( + )u0(  d1   Z(XA)) + (1      )u0(  d2   Z(XA))
) [u0(  d1   Z(XB))   u0(  d1   Z(XA))] + (1   )[u0(  d2   Z(XB))   u0(  d2   Z(XA))]
 [u0(  d1   Z(XA))   u0(  d2   Z(XA))] > 0
) Z(XB) > Z(XA) ) XB > XA;
which is a contradiction. Therefore, XB > XA.
(2) Corner solutions. Condition 33 might not bind as contributions by countries are bounded
from below, i.e. XA;XB  0. There are two possible corner solutions in which this could be
50the case:
(i) XB = 0 and XA = G;
(ii)XA = 0 and XB = G:
We now show that only case (ii) can be chosen optimally by a central authority, which implies
that in any corner solution XB > XA.
Suppose (i), i.e. XB = 0 and XA = G. Then, the FOC of the central authority with respect to
XA becomes:
@V
@XA =  [( + )u0(dA
1 (a)   Z(G)) + (1      )u0(dA
2 (a;b)   Z(G))]Z0(G)
+ [u0(dB
1 (a)) + (1   )u0(dB
2 (a;b))]Z0(0):
This can be rearranged to:
@V
@XA = [u0(dB
1 (a))Z0(0)   u0(dA
1 (a)   Z(G))Z0(G)]
+ (1      )[u0(dB
2 (a;b))Z0(0)   u0(dA
2 (a;b)   Z(G))Z0(G)]
+ [u0(dB
2 (a;b))Z0(0)   u0(dA
1 (a)   Z(G))Z0(G)] < 0;





1 . Welfare could be improved by
decreasing XA and increasing XB. Therefore, XA = G cannot be the optimal solution chosen
by a central authority.
Proof of Proposition 10
Proof.
(1) A contract (~ a; ~ XA) must imply a Pareto improvement as otherwise the participation con-
straint of one country would be violated.
(2) A change in actions alone (excluding the case of Country A or Country B being indierent
between a bail-out and another action) cannot induce a Pareto improvement. Suppose there is
no intervention by the governments or a bail-out of Bank B, i.e. a 2 f(n;n);(n;bo)g. Then, if
the central authority mandates (bo;n), Country A is made worse o as V A
bo;n < maxfV A
n;bo;V A
n;ng.
Suppose there is no intervention by the governments, that is a = (n;n). Then, if the central
51authority mandates (n;bo), Country B is made worse o as V B
n;bo < V A
n;n.
(3) A change in the contribution levels without a change of actions cannot bring a Pareto im-
provment. Suppose ~ a = a. Then, any change in the contribution levels makes one country
better o and one country worse of as at an optimum G(a;b) = XA + XB binds.
(4) A change in the degree of the bail-out cannot induce a Pareto improvement as the degree of
the bail-out b does not aect the welfare of the country that does not conduct the bail-out.
(5) a can only be inecient if a 2 f(n;bo);(n;n)g (see Proposition 3). Furthermore, it follows
that if a = (n;bo), then ~ a 2 f(bo;n)g and if a = (n;n), then ~ a 2 f(bo;n);(n;bo)g.
(6) If a country did not do a bail-out before, and agrees in the contract to do so, then it has to
receive a positive payment. This is the case as the country weakly preferred not to do a bail-out
and as the gains from the change of action are shared.
Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. We consider the two cases where (1) Country A ring-fences rst, and (2) Country B
ring-fences rst. We solve each case by backward induction.
(1) Given ring-fencing by Country A, the welfare levels of Country B for the dierent responses
(no intervention, bail-out, ring-fencing) are as follows:
V B
rf;n = u(qr), with qr =




rf;bo = u(  d1   G(b)) + (1   )u(b   G(b)); with G(b) = z  d1   r







rf;rf = u(  d1) + (1   )u(  d2):
It follows from this that the best response of Country B to ring-fencing by Country A is ring-
fencing. The welfare level for Country A, if it ring-fences rst, is:
V A
rf;rf = u( q):
Comparing this with Equations 19, 20 and 22, it can be seen that Country A never chooses to
ring-fence rst.
(2) Given ring-fencing by Country B, the welfare levels of Country A for the dierent responses
52(no intervention, ring-fencing) are:
V A
n;rf;n = u(qr), with qr =




n;rf;rf = u( q):
Note that a bail-out by Country A will not be chosen in the third round. If Country A prefers
that option, it does already choose it in the rst round. Therefore, given that Country B ring-
fences, a bail-out cannot be optimally chosen by Country A. The best response of Country A to
ring-fencing by Country B is ring-fencing. The welfare level of Country B, if it ring-fences rst,
is:
V B
n;rf;rf = u(  d1) + (1   )u(  d2);
which is strictly higher than all other welfare levels except for the case where Country A does a
bail-out. Therefore, if Country A does not do a bail-out, Country B always ring-fences.
Proof of Proposition 14
Proof.
(i) a = (bo;n) ) V A
bo;n > V A
n;rf;rf. Therefore, together with V B
bo;n = V B
n;rf;rf, we have V A
bo;n +
V B
bo;n > V A
n;rf;rf + V B
n;rf;rf.
(ii) a = (n;rf;rf) ) V A
bo;n  V A
n;rf;rf ) V A
bo;n + V B
bo;n  V A
n;rf;rf + V B
n;rf;rf.
A clear ranking in terms of welfare between (n;bo) and (n;rf;rf) is not possible because V A
n;bo >
V A
n;rf;rf, but V B
n;rf;rf < V B
n;bo.
Appendix B. Lump-sum taxation
With lump-sum taxation, Country A always prefers (bo;n) over (n;n), as long as  < 1. Due
to the free-riding problem, no clear statement can be made on (bo;n) vs. (n;bo).
53Proof.
V A
bo;n > V A
n;n
, ( + )u(  d1     d1) + (1   )u(  d2     d1) > u( q)
) u(  d1     d1) > u( q)
,  d1     d1 >  q















y + (1   y)r

:
This is true as  < 1 ) y < 1:
With lump-sum taxation, Country B always does a bail-out. In the following we prove that
a full bail-out implies a higher welfare in Country B than no intervention.
Proof.
V B
n;bo > V B
n;n
, u(  d1   z(  d1   ^ q)) + (1   )u(  d2   z(  d1   ^ q)) > u( q)
) u(  d1   z(  d1   ^ q)) > u( q)
,  d1   z(  d1   ^ q) >  q
,  d1(1   z) + z
 q + z  d1
1 + z
   q > 0
,  d1(1   z) +
z2  d1    q
1 + z
> 0
,  d1    q > 0:
54Appendix C. First-order conditions of the central authority with
scal power
Suppose the central authority implements a bail-out of Bank A, then it faces the following FOCs:
@V
@b
ja=(bo;n) = A(1      )u0(b   Z(XA))
  B 






@XAja=(bo;n) =  A 




u0(  d1   Z(XB)) + (1   )u0(  d2   Z(XB))

Z0(XB):










@XAja=(n;bo) =  Au0(^ q   Z(XA))Z0(XA) + B 
u0(  d1   Z(XB)) + (1   )u0(b   Z(XB))

Z0(XB):
Appendix D. The bail-out game with simultaneous moves
Note that the following three inequalities hold:
V A
n;bo > V A
n;n;
V B
bo;n > V B
n;n;
V B
bo;n > V B
n;bo:
55Therefore, all possible welfare orderings for Country A are:
(A-i) V A
bo;n > V A
n;n and V A
bo;n > V A
n;bo;
(A-ii) V A
bo;n > V A
n;n and V A
bo;n  V A
n;bo;
(A-iii) V A
bo;n  V A
n;n:
For Country B all possible welfare orderings are:
(B-i) V B
n;bo > V B
n;n;
(B-ii) V B
n;bo  V B
n;n:
Combining the two countries, there are in total 6 dierent orderings possible. The following
proposition reports all equilibria for all cases:
Proposition 15 (i) Suppose (A-i) and (B-i) hold, then the game has one Nash equilibrium
a = (bo;n).
(ii) Suppose (A-i) and (B-ii) hold, then the game has one Nash equilibrium a = (bo;n).
(iii) Suppose (A-ii) and (B-i) hold, then the game has two Nash equilibria a
1 = (bo;n) and
a
2 = (n;bo).
(iv) Suppose (A-ii) and (B-ii) hold, then the game has one Nash equilibrium a = (bo;n).
(v) Suppose (A-iii) and (B-i) hold, then the game has one Nash equilibrium a = (n;bo). (vi)
Suppose (A-iii) and (B-ii) hold, then the game has one Nash equilibrium a = (n;n).
Note that in case (iii) there are two Nash equilibria. While in this case Vn;n is always smaller
than Vn;bo, there is no clear ordering between Vbo;n and Vn;bo. Both (bo;n) and (n;bo) are
equilibria of the simultaneous game and can, depending on parameters, be ecient. Thus,
in the simultaneous game, coordination failure can occur. This is the main dierence to the
sequential game where instead a free-riding problem arises.
Appendix E. Unilateral commitment
Suppose a country can commit to an action. From the structure of the sequential game it is
obvious that only commitment of the second mover is relevant. Commitment of Country B can
tackle the potential ineciency due to free-riding by Country A. In a situation described by (ii)
56in Proposition 2 commitment can change the equilibrium outcome. If Country B commits not to
intervene, then the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is a = (bo;n). As V B
bo;n > V B
n;bo, Country
B benets from the possibility to commit, while Country A looses as V A
bo;n < V B
n;bo. The same
considerations apply to the case with cross-country deposits. With cross-country deposits, it
may also be sucient for removing the free-riding problem that Country B commits to a degree
of bail-out b < b in order to induce the equilibrium a = (bo;n). A lower b decreases the welfare
level of Country A given a bail-out in Country B just as the commitment to no intervention
does.
Appendix F. Winners and losers under a central authority with
scal power
There are three possible cases in which a central authority with scal power chooses a set of
actions dierent to the outcome of the sequential game. These are:
(i) a = (n;n) and a0 = (n;bo);
(ii) a = (n;n) and a0 = (bo;n);
(iii) a = (n;bo) and a0 = (bo;n):
In the following we study for each of these cases, which of the two countries wins and looses
due to the presence of a central authority with scal power. The results are derived assuming
symmetric welfare weights, i.e. A = B.
(i) a = (n;n) and a0 = (n;bo). We show that in this case, under a central authority with
scal power, welfare in Country B is strictly higher than in Country A, i.e. V B
n;bo > V A
n;bo. In
Proposition 9, we showed that XB > XA.
Therefore:
u0(^ q   Z(XA))





, u0(  d1   Z(GB(b)   XA)) + (1   )u0(b   Z(GB(b)   XA)) < u0(^ q   Z(XA)):
57Due to concavity of u0(), it follows that:
u(  d1   Z(GB(b)   XA)) + (1   )u(b   Z(GB(b)   XA)) > u(^ q   Z(XA))
, V B
n;bo > V A
n;bo:
As both countries would have the same welfare level in the sequential game, that is V A
n;n =
V B
n;n = u( q), this implies that the net gain of Country B from the presence of a central authority
with scal power is also larger than that of Country A. Note that while the former is strictly
positive, it is possible for the latter to be negative.
(ii) a = (n;n) and a0 = (bo;n). We show that in this case, under a central authority with
scal power, welfare in Country B is strictly higher than in Country A, i.e. V B
bo;n > V A
bo;n. In
Proposition 9, we showed that XB > XA 8b 2 [  d1;  d2]. Therefore:
u0(  d1   Z(XA))
u0(  d1   Z(GB(b)   XA))
> 1
, u0(  d1   Z(GB(b)   XA)) < u0(  d1   Z(XA))
, u(  d1   Z(GB(b)   XA)) > u(  d1   Z(XA))
, V B
bo;n > V A
bo;n:
Again, as welfare in the two countries in the sequential game is equal, this implies that Country
B enjoys a larger and strictly positive net gain. Country A can gain or loose due to the presence
of a central authority.
(iii) a = (n;bo) and a0 = (bo;n). The proof on the welfare ordering under a0 = (bo;n) from
(ii) remains valid. Therefore, welfare in Country B is strictly larger than welfare in Country A.
In this case though, no clear statement can be made on who enjoys higher net gains relative to
the sequential game, as GA might be larger than GB, and therefore it is possible that XB > GB.
Thus, each country might gain or loose due to the presence of a central authority with scal
power.
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